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THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LATE CHANGES Impartially Examined:

IN A

Letter from a Son of CANDOR to the Public Advertiſer.

Scurrantis ſpeciem præbere, profeſſus amicum
Ut matrona meretrici diſpar erit, atque
Diſcolor, infido ſcurra diſtabit amicus
Percunctatorem fugito: nam garrulus idem eſt.

HORACE.

LONDON:

Printed for J. ALMON, oppoſite Burlington-Houſe in Piccadilly. 1765.

PRINCIPLES

OF THE

LATE CHANGES

Impartially Examined:

IN A

Letter from a GENTLEMAN to the Author.

LONDON:

Printed for J. Almon, opposite Burlington-House in Piccadilly. 1765.

LETTER, &c.

SIR,

THE midwifery of your paper has brought forth a very extraordinary production, in the ſhape of an *Extract of a letter ſent to a gentleman in the country*, dated *London, July* 20, 1765, inſerted in the Public Advertiſer of Thurſday the 5th of September *. Whe-

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Extract of a Letter ſent to a Gentleman in the Country, dated London, July 20, 1765.

* As to the aſtoniſhment in your diſtant parts of the country, at the preſent change of the Miniſtry, I can eaſily believe it; ſince we that are on the ſpot, and conſequently more able to foreſee ſuch events, were not a little ſurprized at it ourſelves: not ſo much, however, at the diſmiſſion of the late Miniſters, as at the choice of their ſucceſſors. But tho' I do not wonder at your ſurprize, I doubt much whether this change, as ſtriking as it is, will be able to remove your prejudices, with reſpect to the pretended influence of the Earl of B——e, on all what the K—— does, or reſolves to do. I hope, however, that this Prince will find means, ſooner or later, to convince you all, that he did not want to be influenced by any body to *feel* and to *reſent* the behaviour of ſome of his late ſervants towards himſelf; and that he had magnanimity and reſolution enough of his own to rid himſelf of their arrogance, and his people of their inſufficiency, by forgetting and forgiving the paſt conduct of this *new Set of Men*. If *theſe* are grown wiſe by the fate of their predeceſſors, they will ſtrive to pleaſe the nation by better meaſures than an attempt to betray their royal maſter into the paſſing of an act, derogatory to the honor of his crown and family; and by a better and more decent conduct, than that of ſo ungratefully and ungracefully flying in his face. If not, I do not doubt but

ther any ſuch letter was ever written in private correſpondence I know not, neither do I

the people will for once open their eyes, and perceive, that their true intereſts are perpetually ſacrificed to the ambition of ſuch parties, as have no other view than to introduce, each in their turn, a perfect, tho' diſguiſed *Ariſtocracy*, under the ſhadow of a *monarchial Government*, by monopolizing the whole power of *this* moſt ſhining and eſſential part of the conſtitution; and that in caſe of their ſucceſs, they would (in imitation of ſome of their predeceſſors under the late reign) care as little for the liberty of the ſubject, as they affect to do for the prerogative of the crown: whilſt his preſent M——— has ſhewn in the dawning of his reign (by ſuch acts and declarations as ought to endear him for ever to a grateful people) that in preſerving the right he has to chuſe his Miniſters, his ſole view is no other than to maintain the conſtitution in its pureſt integrity.

I likewiſe do not doubt, or at leaſt hope, that in ſuch a caſe the nation in general, and even thoſe very parties (which often owe their ſtrength to ſtrange and unnatural connections) would not be ſo deſtitute of men of integrity and capacity, as to deprive the K—— of all means of forming a Miniſtry on true *Principles of Patriotiſm*, and conſequently perfectly agreeable and conformable to *his own*. Perhaps, that in ſuch a caſe Mr. P—tt himſelf would not decline (in ſpite of his infirmities) to appear at the head of the reſt; ſince it is actually affirmed by his own friends, as well as others, that this would already have happened in the late buſtle, had not Lord T——— (to whom he is under a ſacred engagement not to act without him) obſtinately refuſed not only to join with him, but even to give him the leaſt reaſon for his refuſal. It is moreover aſſured, and highly probable, that Lord T——'s motive for defeating Mr. P—tt's compliance with the K——'s commands, was no other than the ſaving his brother Geo. ——, in conſequence of their reconciliation; not being able to perſuade himſelf, that after Mr. P—tt's being out of the queſtion, the K—— would reſolve to have recourſe to any body elſe: but to the contrary, that his M—— would overlook what had paſſed, and make the beſt of his untoward ſervants. He had at firſt ſome reaſon to think that he had gueſſed right, and would perhaps have ſucceeded in his ſcheme, had not the D. of ———, from the ſame perſuaſion, continued in ſuch a behaviour towards his M———, as no private Man would have ſuffered in any one

I care. . I ſhould judge from the publication, as well as from the ſtile and tendency of the performance, that it made its firſt appearance where I have read it, and was originally deſigned for a more extenſive communication, than to convey, with an air of authority, *miſinformation* under the ſhew of intelligence to one friend in the country, or his circle of acquaintance.

However, be that as it may, what aſſumes the form of a private letter, is a profeſt po-

 litical

one of his inferiors; and which determined the K——— inſtantaneouſly, and of his own accord, to get rid of ſuch provocations at any rate.—Thus it is that Lord T——— has had the misfortune to rob his brother-in-law of the Glory of ſhewing his love for his country, and his gratitude to his King, by reſcuing the honor of the crown, and the intereſts of the nation, out of the hands of inſolence and inability; not only without ſaving his brother Geo. ———, but by depriving him perhaps of the very means of recovering from his fall.———And thus it is likewiſe, that according to our beſt intelligence, we owe the choice the K—— has made of his preſent M————ry, to no other influence than that of the *over-bearing* head of one family, and the *over-grown* one of another, on their reſpective dependants.—I heartily join with you and your neighbors in your wiſh, that it may all turn out for the beſt. Perhaps this new Miniſtry may find means to ſupport itſelf, in ſpite of its former and preſent Miniſtry, by the additional weight of his M—'s own intereſt, and by ſome patriotic meaſures of theirs, inſtead of ſelfiſh, impoſing, and intriguing ones, if not, we muſt hope that they may give room for ſome ſuch further changes, as will at once be agreeable to both the K— and his people; whoſe mutual *Wiſhes*, I am fully perſuaded, with all thoſe that have the leaſt knowledge of his M——'s perſonal character, are no leſs the ſame, than their *Intereſts*, provided no ariſtocratical parties, or cabals, find means to make the latter claſh, by hiding or diſguiſing the former.

litical paper, now in print, and as ſuch muſt have an Author, who ſtakes his reputation upon the ſkill and integrity he manifeſts. His character, I think, the motto prefixt to theſe ſpeculations, deſcribes without any injuſtice to his pretenſions: and I chooſe to give him his due in the words of Horace, rather than in thoſe into which they might be tranſlated, only to ſpare myſelf the pain of uſing ſuch expreſſions, as one of that ſtamp ſhould expect.

That the Writer is *a Tool*, is evident. *Whoſe* tool, it ſhall be my buſineſs to lay open; from his own ſplay foot, which is to be ſeen, notwithſtanding all the art he has uſed to hide it. He is manifeſtly one of the tribe of ſycophant adulators, who, according to the Poet's elegant compariſon, worſhip a Patron, not as virtuous friends and good citizens venerate true Patriots, and perſons of known worth and merit, for the ſake of the talents, the virtues and honeſty they admire in them; but as a proſtitute loves her paramour, for the gain ſhe lives by.

The regards he ſeems to profeſs, tho' more inſidious, are juſt as inſincere as the averſions are hireling and ſervile, which he pretends to proclaim. His praiſe and his cenſure he diſtributes

diſtributes very much at random, becauſe they are probably both ſold at the beſt rate they can fetch; and neither has any other meaſure than the price they are to bring. But ſurely, if this mercenary were to be paid according to the value of his work, or in proportion to the ſervice it will do the cauſe he wiſhes to ſupport, though he is aſhamed to avow it, his reward would indeed be very ſmall.

The letter (as 'tis called) though ſwelled with all the ſelf-importance, that is a common attendant upon the moſt conſpicuous inanity, is nothing but a jumble of a very injudicious mixture. The Writer aims at wounding others, and has no more ſkill than to know, that it was neceſſary to hide himſelf. He did not attend to it, that his very weapons would diſcover from what camp he came, and in the way he handles them, they do moſt miſchief to his own ſide. But what with his lack of knowledge, and the neceſſity he is under to diſſemble, he is not a little muddy, dark and obſcure; and, if the Preſs has not done him injuſtice, which was needleſs, he is in ſome parts utterly unintelligible: as for inſtance, where he tells us, that *per-*

haps

haps this new miniſtry may find means to ſupport itſelf in ſpite of its former and preſent miniſtry.

'Tis not, however, in animadverting upon the inaccuracies of a compoſition that is wholly below criticiſm, that I ſhould have thought it worth while to engage myſelf. There is, if I miſtake not, ſomething to be learned from this ſilly Partizan: he has not been able to hinder ſome light paſſing thro' his artifical clouds, to clear up a point, which merits attention.

To come at that, we muſt enquire firſt to whom the Writer belongs. So far he has dealt plainly enough with us, that he lets us ſee *in whoſe pay he is not*, or rather pretends not to be. He does not write for the late miniſtry, for in juſtification of the *aſtoniſhment in* the *diſtant part of the country*, he ſays, *we* (the knowing ones,) *that are on the ſpot, and able to foreſee events, tho' we were not a little ſurprized ourſelves at the change*, it was not *at the diſmiſſion of the late Miniſters:* he talks of *the behaviour of ſome of* the ——'s *late ſervants, towards himſelf, which* His M—— could not but *feel* and *reſent:* and he profeſſes a pleaſure in the *magnanimity and reſolution* of the —— with which *he rid himſelf of their arrogance, and his people of their inſufficiency:*

ficiency: the beſt compliment he pays the miniſters lately diſmiſſed is to call them a *party to* whoſe *ambition* the true *intereſts of the people were ſacrificed, who had no other view than to introduce a perfect tho' diſguiſed Ariſtocracy, under the ſhadow of Monarchial Government; by moncpolizing the whole power of this,* which, with a ſublime abſurdity he calls the *moſt ſhining and eſſential part of the conſtitution.*

Theſe are very ſufficient marks not only of this ſcribe's diſpoſitions towards the late Miniſtry, but, which is more to my purpoſe, and of more importance in itſelf, they plainly indicate both *what is not,* and what *really is* the *particular ground* of the Gentleman's quarrel with them; which I ſhall not forget to take notice of hereafter.

As to the preſent Miniſtry, it muſt be confeſt, whatever may really be aimed at (as to which even here, there may be a ſnake in the graſs;) our Correſpondent does not flatter them either. It is no elevating idea that he conveys of them under the name of *this new ſet of men.* Obſerve his modeſty in not calling them *Miniſters.* They have been great ſinners too, for he informs us their *paſt conduct* needed to be *forgotten and forgiven* before they could be employed. It is only with an *if,* and

as

as a ſuppoſition, in which he expreſſes no confidence himſelf, that they are ſpoken of as perſons who may be *grown wiſe by the fate of their predeceſſors*, which if they be, they will mend their manners, and *ſtrive to pleaſe the nation by better meaſures, by a better and more decent conduct, than that of ſo ungratefully flying in the face of their Royal Maſter*: and if they do *not* thus reform, he fails not to give them to underſtand there is a correction reſerved for them too, *which in their turn* they may receive.

Hence, by the way, it is, I think, pretty clearly the opinion of this Gentleman, that the former offence of the *ſucceſſors*, which required atonement and remiſſion, was of the ſame ſort with the guilt of their *predeceſſors*, who are accuſed of flying in the face of their Royal Maſter: and, to be ſure, we all know, that the unpardonable crime laid to the charge of the *late oppoſition*, of which the preſent *Miniſters* were *once* a part, was their countenancing inſults upon the throne: a fault which they might have eſcaped the imputation of, if much paying of court at a critical time could have prevented it.

But that the *characteriſtics* of this Writer, which explain himſelf as much as they diſtinguiſh

tinguiſh thoſe of whom he ſpeaks; may not be doubtful, as indeed they are not, when ſifted from his rubbiſh; he couples with his faint hopes of the amendment of the *new Miniſters*, ſomething more like an apprehenſion than a wiſh of their *ſucceſs*, and ſtrong fear, that in *caſe* of their *ſucceſs they would care as little for the liberty of the ſubject*, (a profeſſion of zeal, which he ſeems to think has been the ſtirrup, by which they mounted into the ſeat of power) *as they affect to do for the prerogative of the Crown. That*, it is eaſy to perceive, is the idol of this champion; nor is it difficult to gueſs the cauſe of his peculiar affection for *Prerogative*, which is a word, that has of late had a ſtrange enchanting ſound; and why he oppoſes it to LIBERTY, two things that no ſound *Conſtitutionaliſt* ever did, or ever will divide.

If the Letter-writer ſeems not to *affect* the preſent or the late miniſters, he ſhews as little fondneſs for one great Perſon, and not more, except in a deceitful appearance, for another, who have both declined offices that were offered them: the former, as he ſays, *obſtinately* refuſing to give the leaſt reaſon for ſo doing, even to his deareſt friend; but from this motive, as the Author ſays, *is aſſured*, to ſave his

 brother;

brother; a motive, which has at leaſt ſome generoſity in it: the latter from a ſacred engagement he is under to his noble Ally, *not to act without him*, by which, we are told, he allows himſelf to be *robbed of the glory of ſhewing his love for his country, and his gratitude to his King, by reſcuing the honor of the Crown, and the intereſt of the Nation:* an obligation not more ſlaviſh than 'tis ſenſeleſs; and therefore an affront to be but imagined. This account, which the Writer gives of theſe two high characters, reduces them pretty near a level, in reality, in his eſteem; and fairly abſolves him from any ſuſpicion of being much enamoured with either.

Whoſe then is this ſhallow Politician? Here he is moſt myſterious, though not quite unfathomable. Let us ſee if we cannot find him out, by marks he has himſelf furniſhed us with. He is ſenſible that his ideal correſpondent might have *prejudices* that 'twas neceſſary to *remove with reſpect to the influence of the E— of B—*, but he uſes one, a very emphatical epithet, by calling it the *pretended* influence. We know who, beſide the late Miniſters, when they were in power, held this ſort of language. It then was, and ſtill is, the conſtant tenor of thoſe moſt attached to

L. B.

L. B. and we are at no loſs for the reaſon of *their* talking in that manner.

The Writer further intimates his *hope, that means will be found ſooner or later to convince* US ALL, *that the* ——— did not *want to be influenced by any body to feel and reſent the behaviour of ſome of his late ſervants:* and the diſmiſſion of them is, with labour *aſcribed to his own magnanimity and reſolution, the behaviour towards his* —— *being ſuch as determined him inſtantaneouſly, and of his own accord, to get rid of ſuch provocations at any rate.*

I think it is full as well not to rend the vail behind which M——y reſides; though this Gentleman is not ſcruphulous that way. All I ſhall ſay is, that this part of his work is evidently pregnant with the dread that a *certain influence* was thought of: and the endeavour to *divert* the eye from it, proves more to me than any attempt to *exculpate* poſſibly could have done. The late Miniſtry, in their end, at leaſt, agreed in one opinion with the bulk, if not the whole of the nation. I do not know if there is any difference at all upon the matter. Sure I am, there need be none: and what I mean, is, I believe as well underſtood as any words I could uſe would make it.

Who are they, that talk of the late Miniſters, their *ungratefully and ungracefully flying in the face of their Royal Maſter?* None that I ever heard of but the connections, and the boſom intimates of L. B. The late Miniſters were long accuſed, and I think not without reaſon, of ſupporting themſelves, by loading their opponents with that ſort of vice: though I know not any thing of the kind, that according to the rules of right judgment, they were guilty of.

The great inſtance in which the late Miniſtry is believed to have diſagreed with ONE whom they could have no intereſt, and therefore I cannot ſuppoſe had any inclination to diſpleaſe, was vindicating the independence of their own ſituation, and aſſerting the due influence, which of right belonged to the reponſibility of their offices.

The deciſive ſtroke of this conteſt, in the ſight of all the world, was turning out Mr. M—e, L— B—'s b—r; which they declared, and moſt unblameably I muſt ſay, to be intended as a mark, that the counſels and the employments of the ſtate were not ſeparated; or to fix the true characteriſtic of any revolution, it was even then more than probable it would produce before long, notwithſtanding the

the ſkinning over of the wound at that time. For that *flagrant* act of adherence to themſelves they ſuffered: and it gave them a merit in their death, that moſt of them would never have acquired any other way. By that means they all ſhared in a ſort of ſympathy at their fall, even from their enemies, that once on a day they had very little chance of finding with moſt people, at the concluſion of their adminiſtration.

When I hear from ſuch Writers as this, of *a diſguiſed Ariſtocracy*, oppoſed not as it ought to be, to democratical confuſion, or ſovereign Liberty, but to *the ſhadow of a Monarchial Government:* and of *monopolizing the whole power of this*, that is called *the moſt eſſential part of the conſtitution*; which is to ſay, it is more eſſential than Liberty itſelf; to which I underſtand, with us, even monarchy as well as adminiſtration to be but the handmaid and the ſervant: I ſay, when I hear ſuch language, at this time of day, I am not ſurprized; for the word that came from the head quarters of the *inviſible* upon the *violent* removal of Mr. M——e, which the Favourite conſidered as an amputation in his own perſon, was —— *what do you mean to deſtroy the Monarchy?*

Monarchy?—to annihilate the firſt of the three eſtates?

But I own ſuch diſcourſe only leads me to think of R——y being captive, and both nobles and people ſubjugated to one lower than the greateſt part of themſelves, and leſs than a very ſubaltern miniſter of government would need to be. I brood over the worſt ſort of monopoly I know, and that is neither the juſt power of the crown, nor the fair influence of adminiſtration; for theſe are the genuine offspring, and they guard as well as conduct the open commerce of the conſtitution: but it is the *dominion* of a dictator in the court, without the name of an office in the State, a *ſingle* ſubject, not ſo much as a ſervant of the Crown, the *creature* of *caprice* and *conjuration*, which converts M—y itſelf into a mere pageant, makes Miniſters abſolute cyphers, and government wholly unſtable and deſpicable: my dread is of the tyranny of *favouritiſm*, ſubjection to which is the moſt irkſome ſlavery: I ſee nothing of *ſhine* or ſplendor, but all dark, contemptible, reproachful; the State in trouble, and the public weal left to chance and hazard.

When our Writer oppoſes an anxiety *for the prerogative of the Crown to a care for the*

Liberty

Liberty of the ſubject, which is a very unnatural divorce; he gives us another infallible mark, what company he keeps. This is an old tune lately revived, and we know whence it came laſt. Some people think to perſuade us, that almighty prerogative has force enough to give Miniſters *two* maſters, not like the good B—s, one *above* another *below*, but one *before* and another *behind* the curtain; and they want alſo to give the people another king, beſides the one who wears the Royal Robes, one more abſolute than the true Sovereign, and quite arbitrary.

This Writer is of that kidney; and he does not leave it to conjecture; for he immediately explains himſelf, when he introduces the *favorite* topic of *preſerving the right the —— has to chooſe his Miniſters* with a *view to maintain the conſtitution in its pureſt integrity*. Few, however, will be deceived ſo far as not to ſee that this in modern dialect means *the power of eſtabliſhing minions:* and hardly any one is ſo ignorant of our own hiſtory, as not to know that nothing ever more corrupted or defiled the conſtitution, than theſe monſters, the race of which we were in hopes had been utterly extinct in this happy country. They always were alike, the bane of Prince and people,

people, and generally proved in the end their own deſtruction.

One ſtricture more remains, if it was neceſſary, to denote the origin and purpoſe of this letter. Mr. P . . is ſpoken of with ſeeming favor; and an inclination expreſt, that he ſhould place himſelf at the head of ſuch a band of Miniſters, as this Writer would mark out for his aſſiſtants. This is well known to have been, for a long time, the language of L. B. and his retainers. There is no myſtery in it at all. Mr. P—'s abilities might do what L. B. is not blind enough not to ſee, it is eſſential to his own ſafety ſhould be done ſome how or other, for ſaving this country from the perdition, on the brink of which, his own incapable and treacherous adminiſtration placed it. L. B. wants a cloak, and Mr. P—'s protection, if it could be procured, upon terms conſiſtent with the end for which it is ſought, might cover the Favorite from danger, or confirm the ſyſtem of his favoritiſm; or, which is as likely to be the truth of the ſecret as either of theſe, if Mr. P— could *any how* have been decoyed into office; upon any thing like conditions of a coalition with L. B.; it might, it has been thought, ſteal his popularity from him,

and

and ſo break down the great barrier againſt the aſſurance of the Favorites influence, and take from another removal of Mr. P—, if they ſhould again differ, the ſting which has been ſo ſeverely felt ſince the laſt, by reaſon of the credit and confidence he has ſo meritoriouſly gained with his grateful and affectionate country. If Mr. P— would fall in with L. B. objects and views, leaving him in the ſtation he has ſeized, like another mercury, to paſs between our Jove and the ſenate of the leſſer gods, offering their petitions to him, and to them returning his pleaſure therein, there is no doubt but the Favorite wiſhes that great man was in an adminiſtration ſo conſtituted.

This was attempted in Auguſt 1763, when L. B. dared to ſhew his face in the negotiation; and the terms then propoſed were the ſtrongeſt proof of what I have been ſaying. To put L. N—th—d at the head of the Treaſury, was an idea ſo ſtrange, that it could only be explained by the approaching alliance, which had already in effect made him a branch of L. B's family, and a very fit Lieutenant to hold the office which cowardice had made him abandon.

Another attempt to get L. T. and Mr. P— in we ſaw made in May 1765, when L. B. did not think fit to appear in the treaty. He certainly then thought that theſe two diſtinguiſhed Patriots, nothing of whoſe greatneſs he knows in his own compoſition, were as wearied of retirement as he himſelf was of controle: and therefore the old propoſition was renewed with this additional abſurdity, that it had then no palliation. The wonder would have been, if it had not ended as it did: and the Public has ſhewn they were ſatisfied, they could not then obtain the Miniſters of their choice, without an abſolute contradiction to their own wiſhes and deſires.

An anecdote has been related, which gives as good an account as any I could deſire of the laſt diſappointment the Public met with, when the offer was made, which, in the opinion of this Writer, it was wrong to refuſe: I have heard, that if L. T. and Mr. P. had come in, when laſt invited, upon their *own true bottom*, the good Citizens of London had a deſign to expreſs their joy, by illuminating the Monument; but that it was ſaid among them, that if the *ſame* Gazette had announced the reſtoration of theſe great Miniſters, and the re-employment, of the Favorite's

vorite's *br——r*, the Monument ſhould have been hung with *mourning*. So much do the Patriots of the city make *no* dependance upon, or connection with L. B.;—*the teſt by which they will try any adminiſtration*: and ſo ſtrongly would they have held a conceſſion of that ſort for a mark of ſome kind of coalition with the object of their juſt averſion, and as an evidence of his invincible ſtrength, and a trophy of his victory over the late adminiſtration, to which the only merit they allow is that of reſiſting his yoke, as they certainly did before their fall.

But the truth is, further ſatisfaction was needleſs upon this head, than the undeniable cauſe of the removal of the late Miniſters might have given any one, let his favor for them have been never ſo little. They certainly did not die for their own ſins; but fell a ſacrifice to their oppoſition, to L. B. which finally became violent. Now that being the caſe, any adminiſtration to come in at an opening ſo made, inſtead of marking their entrance with teſtimonies of favor to L. B.'s particular friends, will, I am ſure, need to do a great deal to remove the ſuſpicions that the manner of their admiſſion muſt create, not only that they go in with his leave, but

by his direct introduction; which it will be hard to ſeparate from the idea of ſomething more, at leaſt in the minds of many people.

However, not to enlarge further on theſe topics at preſent, this concluſion is, I think, warranted, that after the uſage Mr. P. and in his perſon the whole nation, had, when he was driven by L. B. from the glorious and ſucceſsful pilotage of the State, only that *he* might be Lord Paramount over this country, and get *any peace* made to enſure his domination; and upon the due conſideration of the inſidious manner in which it has now ſo often, but always with an uniformity of deceit, been endeavoured to draw Mr. P... back to the wreck of the Public; and withal reflecting upon the utter incompatibility, there muſt be between the objects and views of Mr. P. and L. B; they muſt indeed be very credulous, who can believe that regard for Mr. P—, or love to the country, have any ſhare in a wiſh from L. B. or any of his confidents, to ſee him return to office. Who can imagine, that the door will not always be ſhut upon him, as it has been heretofore, even after he is led to it, unleſs he will enter on terms ſuitable to the Favorite's views?

I cannot

I cannot therefore, look with any favor upon what the Writer of the letter ſays to that purpoſe. The various attempts that have been made to carry theſe wiſhes into effect teach me how to underſtand them. I conder them as themſelves a mark of L. B—'s foot, in every diſcourſe that draws as much his way as this letter has been ſhewn to do. The writer ſpeaks L. B—'s language, only in diſguiſe; and what it is in plain Engliſh, a very little recollection will ſatisfy us, now that we have traced his lineage from his own evidence.

Our Author, ſpeaking with the dignity of the plural number, gives us what he calls *our beſt intelligence* of the cauſes of *the diſmiſſion of the late Miniſters*, and the *choice made of the preſent Miniſtry:* and to thoſe who know any thing of the facts to which only he can allude, particularly as to the alledged faults of the late Miniſtry, which is the key to the whole; this cannot appear to be a miſrepreſentation of his true meaning, whatever his words are. "The late Miniſters wickedly rebelled againſt L. B. who claims the merit of making them, and expected from them the homage and obedience due to a *Creator:* their inſolence became inſupporta-

ble;

ble; their behaviour was *ſuch* as could no longer be *ſuffered*; their *provocations muſt be got rid of at any rate*; therefore they were diſmiſſed *inſtantaneouſly*, (which by the by is a great ſtory, for it was long before it could be got done.) Now you their ſucceſſors, you have yourſelves been great tranſgreſſors, in refuſing ſubmiſſion: but you are *pardoned* and received into favor, not indeed for your own ſakes, but as neceſſary inſtruments to chaſtiſe thoſe whoſe crimes were beyond forgiveneſs; having been found the only ſet who would come in, without which they could not be turned out. However have a care: if you return to your old tricks, or tread in your predeceſſors ſteps, mark the end that is before you; therefore *grow wiſe* by example; and if you would eſcape their fate, in whoſe place you are come, follow not their evil courſes. If you do, there will be found thoſe who will do juſtice upon you alſo, if they ſhould be brought from all the ends of the earth: rather than want hands to execute the provoked vengeance, there will be taken ſtraglers from all Parties, that is the moſt worthleſs of all men: for *in ſuch a caſe, I hope,* (ſays our Writer) *even thoſe very Parties, which often owe their ſtrength to ſtrange and unnatural*

connections,

connections, would not be ſo deſtitute of men of integrity and capacity, as to deprive the —— *of all means of forming a Miniſtry on true principles of Patriotiſm, and conſequently perfectly agreeable and conformable to his own.*"

I have no doubt, the man means that it is the *Favorite*, who is to form ſuch a glorious adminiſtration as he ſpeaks of; and upon what *principles* it will be done *by him*, we have already had ſufficient proof: but from ſuch poiſon as *his* Patriotiſm has appeared to be; —— from Miniſters, whoſe *integrity* conſiſts in conforming to *his* principles, defend us!

Such, I ſay, is the real language of this Writer, and it is indeed the language of truth. I know he ſays, the late Miniſters flew in the face of their Royal Maſter; but that is only his manner of ſpeaking. The facts decide here. Was there ever greater zeal than the late Miniſters manifeſted, for what they called the honour of the ——, though a great part of the nation thought it was no ways concerned in the affair? and perhaps they could produce very good proof, that they did not at that time contradict the R——l pleaſure? They brought a load upon themſelves, by the violent proſecution of that cauſe, which had well nigh overſet them. But can

any

any man ſpecify an overt act of the late adminiſtration, that was ever ſo much as inſinuated to be a ground for the charge of flying in the face of the ——, or in which his mind was forced, till the buſineſs of the Regency Bill came in hand?

That, 'tis true, brought to light ſome part of the dark ſcenes, and gave a peep through the curtain. But before that time, the heads of the adminiſtration had been ſuſpected of ſubmitting to the influence of L. B—: they were called his deputies and delegates. Their defence againſt that accuſation, often made, was that they abjured him; and had even *ſtipulated his removal* not only from the K—'s councils, but from his *reſidence*, when they undertook his ſervice, in their own perſons. They ſtated themſelves to be in *reality* what they were *officially* the K—'s Miniſters, *and reſponſible* as ſuch: they found themſelves at laſt obliged to ſay, and they did it publicly, that they thought it was as neceſſary as fit, in order to carry on the public buſineſs, that thoſe who had the charge of it ſhould have their maſter's confidence; and that it was neither decent nor expedient, that great meaſures of government, highly intereſting to the commonweal, ſhould be concerted and

planned

planned without the participation of thoſe who, by their offices, are anſwerable both for the propriety and the ſucceſs of the K—'s counſels; they believed ſomething more was due to them than juſt to be *called* upon to execute and carry thro' what others to whom it did *not* belong, and with whom they had no communications, adviſed, and projected. Can any one deny this to be the language of ſenſe, and reaſon, and the nature of the conſtitution?

If the manner in which the affair of the Regency was produced; the hiſtory of which is now no ſecret, gave theſe Miniſters room to think the ——'s confidence was not where it ought to be, the event has juſtified their opinion. But what was their conduct on that occaſion? They would not reject a ſalutary meaſure, becauſe they were not the firſt adviſed with upon it: they adopted the ſcheme with all that duty that it became ſubjects as well as ſervants to receive the motions of the K—'s paternal care of his people and family: they even admitted a part of it, which, whoever adviſed gave bad and hazardous counſel to the Crown; and, they are hardly to be excuſed for yielding, I dare ſay againſt their opinion, to a deviation from

the only compleat model upon record, of the moſt recent and reſpectable authority, in ſuffering a propoſition to be made for an unexampled encroachment upon the moſt inherent, moſt fundamental, and moſt eſſential rights of Parliament, and a dangerous precedent for an addition to the pretenſions of the Crown, by entruſting to the ſole and ſecret nomination of the Prince upon the Throne (who may not always be ſo worthy of confidence as his preſent Majeſty) the appointment of the perſon to exerciſe the regal authority for, it may be not only a long miniority; but an unhappy ſucceſſion of them. Will this Writer himſelf ſay that, in this inſtance, the late Miniſters *flew in the face of their Royal Maſter?*

Does he then mean that they did it, by an amendment that was made upon the firſt draught of the Bill, and was authorized by a meſſage ſigned with the ——'s own hand, only to give the Prince's of the blood a *certain* place in the council of Regency, as the great offices of State do to thoſe who hold them? This, I can conceive to have been thought a flying in the face of the Favorite, who was thereby put to wait 'till a vacancy ſhould happen in the number, before he could be *named*

ed one of the Council. But as the amendment was an indiſpenſible act of juſtice and of duty to the Royal Family itſelf: ſo for the preſent diſappointment it occaſioned to L. B. of a *primary object* of the bill as *firſt concerted*, perhaps to be a ſort of eventual entail of power or influence; I believe the late Miniſters may, with great ſafety, take their trial by their country.

If the Writer of the Letter thinks there yet remains to ſupport his charge of flying in the face of the ——, the other amendment made to obviate a doubt ſtarted concerning the extent of the Royal Family, in regard to the capacity of being Regent, he may pleaſe to recollect, that the doubt which forced the amendment, did not ſpring from any member of the adminiſtration, and tho' the S——y of S—e who brought in the Bill, did afterwards propoſe the amendment, which was unanimouſly agreed to, he did it not 'till after he could have, and certainly had the communications, which were underſtood to be his authority for offering the alteration; nor even quite ſo ſoon as he might, after he had theſe: for ſo far was *he* from being precipitant, that our Letter-writer may have information from L. B. himſelf,

that he, ſitting in the houſe, preſſed L—— H——x to propoſe the limiting words a day before he did it, and for this reaſon did he preſs it, as he himſelf ſaid, that it would make an end of the debate, and becauſe he knew he *then* had the authority for doing it. There is ſurely therefore, as little ground for the charge in this article; and if the amendment was afterwards conſidered as diſagreeable any where, and therefore cauſed to be amended, perhaps, with more *of indelicacy* than of true *reſpect* both to the —— and his Family, the Miniſters ſhewed themſelves ready and zealous to enforce and make effectual the ſuppoſed compliment to his ——, becauſe it was urged under that notion.

The annals of the late adminiſtration do not furniſh another act which our Author can charge to his purpoſe, except the removal of Mr. M—e the brother; and of L— H—d, the coadjutor, and truſty counſellor of the Favorite, unleſs it be that they agreed all to go out together, rather than any one of them to enliſt under L. B.'s banner: which I fancy the Writer of the Letter has an eye to, as one of theſe *ſtrange and unnatural connections to which Parties often owe their ſtrength.*

Theſe

Theſe removals, and eſpecially Mr. M—'s, I have admitted was *flying in the face of the Favorite:* it touched him in the apple of his eye, and was both the ſign and the completion of *Rebellion* againſt him: the Miniſters thereby declared open war againſt *that* influence, and avowed they did ſo. But when was this done? Not till after the ſtorm of L. B.'s vengeance had broke upon their heads for daring to deny their dependence upon, and preſuming to renounce allegiance and ſubjection to him. They had got their diſmiſſion, tho' the counſels of the ſecret adviſers were ſo prepoſterous, that no proviſion was made for a ſucceſſion of the Miniſtry.

The Miniſter, as his reward for concluding the buſineſs of the ſeſſion, was to forward his own removal, by an adjournment of the P——t, till an arrangement of ſucceſſors could be ſettled. Their places were brought to market: but they bore no price: there were no bidders. Then they were called back, and, if what is generally ſaid be true, at the very moment that a treaty was ſtill going on with offers of the adminiſtration to others, not cloſed, but even continued after the recall. Thus ſaved, if it could be ſo called, only becauſe none were then found

to

to take their room, they once more took a freſh leaſe, as they had done, after the like negociation, in September 1763, and the ſacrifice of Mr. M——e, ſealed the new bargain, which was inſiſted upon for the declared purpoſes, that have been mentioned. They went no farther, and it was going no great length; far from carrying things with a high hand, when the humiliation muſt have been enough almoſt to admit of any thing. It was a ſort of a further trial to enforce the *pacta conventa* againſt the *Favorite*'s influence, the infractions of which they had ſeen and felt.

This, to be ſure, had the appearance of giving a blow to the Favorite: but the wounded ſerpent, from the inſtant, rallied his ſtrength, and returned to the charge; and one moment was not loſt, from the time of the apparent reconciliation and re-eſtabliſhment of the old Miniſtry, till their total overthrow was accompliſhed. The interim was a perfect *ſede vacante*, nothing done nor indeed could be done in ſuch a ſituation, except giving away ſome things that fell, by the diſpoſition of which the Miniſters could not but ſee the power was departed from them. So that it may be truly ſaid, Mr. M——e's

M——e's removal was almoſt the laſt act of the late Miniſtry.

For this fact, clearly, they were executed, when their reprieve expired. Neither their public conduct, nor the private characters of any of them, had the leaſt hand in their deſtruction: They did not die for *violations of liberty*; to expiate *general warrants*, *ſeizure of papers*, *reſtrictions of* the *Privilege*, and *ſecurity* of *Parliament*; reſtraint on the *Freedom of the Preſs*, *rigorous crown proſecutions*; *informations* for *conſtructive contempts*; *eſſoins*, *privilege*, and other *obſtructions* to the *courſe* of *juſtice*. Theſe, with all their attendants and conſequences, whether juſtly or unjuſtly laid at their door, does not matter to the preſent purpoſe, were blaſts which they had weathered: and they could not with any reaſon come as charges, at leaſt from the grand enemy.

It was not their *unpopularity*, nor *Canada bills*, the *Manilla ranſom*, the *Demolition* of *Dunkirk*, encroachments in the *fiſhing* of *Newfoundland*, or diſturbances in the ſettlements on the coaſt of *Africa*, nothing of the *foreign ſyſtem*, or *domeſtick management* of affairs, that haſtened theſe miniſters to their end. They were not offered up to the *complaints*,

plaints, the *cries*, nor the *wiſhes* of the *people*: Neither were they victims to the reſentment of *foreign courts*, as ſometimes has been the fate of Miniſters: for the Miniſters reſident here, from thoſe powers, whoſe averſion would not be a bad rule for our choice, were fooliſh enough at the time openly to ſpeak out their apprehenſions of a change, declaring, in a manner as inſolent as indecent, but that ſhould indeed give us a leſſon, if we had ears to hear, that their courts would conſider the reinſtating of Mr. P. as little ſhort of a declaration of war, and would prepare themſelves accordingly.

The late adminiſtration had not failed in what is commonly called the ——'s ſervice: one ſeſſion was got over after another; a great and growing majority; deſerters daily coming in; following the *loaves* and the *fiſhes*; and oppoſition dwindled into nothing, by the impatience, unſteddineſs and incapacity of its rotten part. The Miniſter had ſhewn, he could raiſe the ſupplies, and I am apt to believe had aſſurances of that ſort for the future that might be relied upon. To do him no more than juſtice; under many diſadvantages and difficulties, he had to ſtruggle with, he had been able to make the

ſervice

ſervice go on, which was a great deal, conſidering in what ſtate affairs were when committed to his care: he left it better than he found it; and acquired credit and character by his own perſonal conduct, particularly in that department of which he had the immediate direction. In ſhort, his ſtrength was his crime: it was his ſucceſs that ruined him. If he would have held *under another*, he might have been allowed to do the drudgery of office long enough: but he would not ſubmit to the Favorite: and for treaſon againſt *him* there was no remiſſion.

If this be a true ſtate of the caſe, and in truth it is, let any ſound thinking perſon only aſk his own mind, what reflections it preſents to him? What comfort does a change of adminiſtration for ſuch a cauſe, under ſuch circumſtances, and by ſuch inſtruments, miniſter to the people of England? Can it give any ſatisfaction even to thoſe who moſt wiſhed for a change of Miniſtry? Men long to ſee government once more reſume its wonted ſtability and dignity: even the fooliſh thirſt of novelty has almoſt been ſatiated, we have had ſo many changes: I believe the ſeals have one way or other ſhifted hands eight or ten times within theſe

two or three years. But at this rate nothing can be permanent.

There was a wiſh for a change of the Miniſtry: but a change on ſuch a principle as this has been made is only more to be regretted, than the continuance of the thing, that was itſelf diſliked. Parties produce changes, and we expect them as the natural effect of a natural cauſe; nor do we deſire to be without Parties to occaſion changes. I do not mean Parties in *principle*, which are diſtreſs and ruin; but Parties in *opinion* in friendſhips, connections, and attachments. Parties of that ſort are but ventilators to fan the conſtitution, and purify adminiſtration. They overturn one another by ſuperiority of ſtrength, excellence of ſyſtem, or advantage in abilities: and while theſe things hold the balance of power, oppoſition will itſelf be a means of ſafety, and an inſtrument of the public good. The conteſt muſt both regulate and eſtimate the contenders: and the riſe and fall of Miniſters in ſuch a caſe, will moſt probably be for the true intereſt of the nation, as thoſe will prevail who have the moſt influence, that is, ſtand beſt with their country, are ableſt to ſerve her, and adopt the moſt approved meaſures.

But

But when a *Favorite* lords it over every thing, all Parties are loſt in the *vortex* of his power, all alike debaſed and ſunk. Nothing can ſhine but from the reflection of his favor: ſycophants and paraſytes only aſcend: all contention is occupied in ſtudying his will, and courting his ſmiles. He chooſes thoſe who will beſt ſerve *him*: and inſtead of actors, we have puppets: the Miniſters of the Crown are the ſlaves of a minion; obedience to whom is the only teſt of fitneſs, and ſuppleneſs the beſt qualification for employment. This we have ſeen fully verified before our eyes.

The fall of the late Miniſtry, proves what it was that made them ſtand ſo long, againſt all the external ſhocks they ſuffered; it ſhews what will make any *other* undergo the ſame fate that they, at laſt did, not only without a fault, but it may be for the greateſt merit. They lived by permiſſion, and were extinguiſhed by a puff of the ſame breath that gave them exiſtence.

The beſt adminiſtration has leſs ſecurity againſt this *inviſible power* than the worſt; and there can be no good one that will not ſin after the ſimilitude of that offence which proved mortal to the laſt. This ſecret lever

will move the ſtrongeſt building that does not reſt upon the odious foundation of *Favoritiſm*. In September 1763, one ſhake was given; but as there might then be hopes, the judgment was ſuſpended, to try the fruits of that ſevere admonition to repentance: in May 1765, the ſtroke was more violent, becauſe the iniquity was by that time come to a deſperate height: and laſt of all, the meaſure being full, the execution of the ſentence of exciſion could no longer be delayed.

But how long can this go on? This country is not in a ſituation to be trifled with. Many and great are the evils that threaten us, both from without and within. The diſtemper needs the ableſt Phyſician, and much leiſure to perfect a cure: but Miniſters of late have had enough to do to keep themſelves in the ſeat: if ſchemes could have been formed, time was not allowed to put them in practice: and every change puts us farther back.

There are Miniſters whoſe energy the nation has experienced, and to them their confidence is attached. They deſire to ſee the glorious names reſtored, that can give weight to our counſels, and force to our treaties; whoſe credit will engage the alliances of our friends,

friends, and their terror awe the diſpoſitions of our enemies. Theſe might preſerve peace abroad, and bring back domeſtic tranquillity: ſettle things upon a ſound bottom, and improve the ſtate of quiet, to make proviſion for the evil day, when the clouds that are always gathering may chance to break. The remonſtrances and repreſentations of ſuch Miniſters would not need to be often repeated in any court in Europe. But while their inflexibility, and the Favorite's power continues, our hopes are cut off. God forbid, that ſome dreadful cataſtrophe be not the firſt thing to awaken us; and yet there never was more reaſon to apprehend it.

One might naturally enough aſk here, what guarantee the preſent Miniſters have got? Have they gone to the only office there is to enſure them? Or do they take the riſk upon themſelves? The proſpect of ſtability to them, which the letter before us exhibits, is this, *perhaps this new Miniſtry may find means to ſupport itſelf in ſpite of its former and preſent Miniſtry, by the additional weight of the* ——'s *own intereſt.* I cannot tell, as I ſaid before, what the man means by *the preſent Miniſtry being ſupported in ſpite of the preſent Miniſtry*, unleſs it be, that it is in ſpite of their own imbecility,

becility, and the natural fragility of its compoſition. If he thinks ſo, it is very neceſſary he ſhould point out ſome ſupport, tho' he does make it but a matter of hazard that they can ſtand with any: and it was equally needful that it ſhould be an *additional* ſupport, more than the late Miniſtry had, when they fell. That which he aſſigns them, according to the dictionary by which I explain this Gentleman's writing, which is only the experience of ſome time paſt, is no other than the ſupport of the *Favorite*'s intereſt. He muſt mean ſo: and he is very right, for that will certainly be additional, being what the late adminiſtration had not in the end ſincerely: it is the only thing his words can point out to us.

It is now matter of trial, whether the new Miniſtry has ſtipulated or ſecured this additional ſupport, and it will be matter of ludicrous experiment if they can ſtand, either with, or without it. The Writer of the Letter himſelf only allows them a chance: and he is in the right there too, for if it ſhall appear that they are ſo weak, as not to be able to carry on the common ſervice, they cannot be ſuſtained by any ſupport which their own ſervice does not uphold. On the other hand, there may be ſuch a ſenſe of weakneſs, as may

make

make it expedient to receive that ſupport; admitting it not to have been bargained for, as the beſt chance of making them ſtand *in ſpite of themſelves*, as this writer ſpeaks.

Whether there is any reference or alluſion to this in one ſort of language, that we hear a little of, amongſt others, all of which are not very conſiſtent, I ſhall not ſay. But it has of late been talked in a *certain quarter, that it is the intereſt of L. B. to ſupport the new Miniſters*; and if this be their opinion, I think it looks very like their expecting, and not only being willing to take, but deſirous to have his aid.

Time will clear up the matter: in the mean while *this new ſett of Men*, as the letter terms them, ſhould always carry in their own mind, what conjectures are the moſt probable to ariſe from the circumſtance of the door by which they entered, and the manner in which it was opened to them,—conjectures which nothing can hinder from turning into *opinions*, but very ſtrong contradictions in *fact*. It will alſo be no leſs for their inſtruction, that if they chooſe to lean upon the ſtaff, which the writer of this Letter puts into their hands, they remember his admonition as to the terms upon which it is

to

to be had, viz. their having *a better and more decent conduct*, than their predeceſſors ſuffered for; as the only thing that can prevent their having *their* turn of a change.

For though he ſuppoſes they may have a licenſe to call into their aſſiſtance *ſome patriotic meaſures of their own*, he very exactly informs them of what ſort theſe muſt be: they are to come *inſtead of ſelfiſh impoſing ones*, ſuch as the laſt Miniſtry purſued when they forced out of office the *Favorite*'s br——r. He expreſly warns the new Miniſters of one indiſpenſible *proviſion*, to warrant the hope of no *further changes*; and that is, that there be no *ariſtocratical parties or cabals*, ſuch as the late Miniſtry formed; when they reſolved to ſtick together in reſiſtance of the *Favorite*.

Theſe are matters which concern the new Minſters themſelves; but they have undertaken an arduous taſk: they know beſt upon what ground they have undertaken it, or how they expect to get through it. Our writer's account of their introduction to office, furniſhes but indifferent hopes to the Publick. People generally think the abilities of men, the wiſhes of their country, the exigences of the ſtate, ought to have ſome weight in the nomination of Miniſters, eſpecially

cially in the moſt critical ſeaſons. This Writer tells us, thoſe, now in the great poſts of the kingdom, came to them by none of theſe things: they owe their preferment to L. T.'s declining, and to the *Duke of B—d-f—d's continuing in ſuch a behaviour, as no private man could have ſuffered in any one of his inferiors*, which produced an *inſtantaneous determination to get rid of ſuch provocations at any rate*: and, *thus it is, ſays* the Writer of the Letter, *that according to our beſt intelligence, we owe the choice of the preſent M——y to no other influence, than that of the over-bearing head of one family, and the over-grown head of another, on their reſpective dependants.* A poor compliment truly to the Miniſters, and a miſerable comfort to the country, which much needs an adminiſtration, *ex craſſiori tela.*

So far I muſt agree with this writer, that the choice of the new Miniſtry was *involuntary.* Certainly others refuſed before they had it in their power to accept. Even they themſelves, we are (to ſpeak in our author's ſtile) *aſſured*, did refuſe only thrice before they accepted: not indeed, it may be believed, from any reluctance to batten upon the good things of government, but from a

conciouſneſs, that in theſe circumſtances, it was likely to turn as little to their own account, as it ſeemed to be for any good purpoſe to the publick.

So often, if what is ſaid be true, and it has not been denied, did the new Miniſters decline; and, as it is added, they very earneſtly preſſed the firſt recuſants, to ſerve under the Favorites undeniable lieutenant, who was originally held out as the general under whom they were to enliſt. A better proof could not be given, that they only deſired to profit of greater ſtrength than their own, to ſecure *a* portion of office to themſelves.

This, however, was in the ſtrongeſt manner poſſible, declaring themſelves utterly incapable for the charge they at laſt undertook: and truly one cannot help ſaying, it is great modeſty for people to expect that others ſhould have a better opinion of their abilities, than they themſelves have; and that the publick ſhould think the important concerns of national intereſt, ſafe with thoſe who did not ſo much as pretend to be qualified for the truſt. Whether their country will paſs the ſame judgment of *incapacity*, with thoſe who in chooſing for themſelves have

have decided for her, the event muſt prove. But as all have a concern in the ſhattered bark, however, few take a real intereſt in her ſafety, the language of many to her at this hour, undoubtedly is

Nil pictis timidus navita puppibus
Fidit: tu, niſi ventis,
Debes ludibrium, cave,
Nuper ſollicitum quæ mihi tedium,
Nunc deſiderium, curaque non levis
Interfuſa nitentes,
Vites æquora Cyclades.

Were I to hazard a conjecture upon the appearance of things, which is the only foundation of the opinions of the publick; and is at laſt as infallible a guide as that *beſt intelligence*, according to which the Writer of the Letter gives his judgment, I ſhould imagine we are indebted, if not for the *change*, or the *choice* of Miniſters, yet for the Miniſtry being filled up, as we ſee it, to a certain impatience to get into place; which ſome laboured under more than others.

They had long been wearied of *want*, and by a revolt from their own profeſſed principles, and abandoning their pretended con-

nections, becauſe neither had for ſome time appeared to be the road to preferment, they had approached as near the pool as they could, againſt the *Angel* ſhould ſtir the waters of emolument: and not being able to prevail upon thoſe whom they had forſaken, but were now again willing to join, when they ſaw the dreadful interdict that had terrified them removed, to go in *any how*, that they might creep upon their ſhoulders; they nobly reſolved, cripple as they found they were, to make one perilous effort to throw themſelves into office, rather than altogether loſe an opportunity, which they were afraid, might fly their embraces, if not greedily ſeized.

Gladly would they have perſuaded thoſe whoſe force they had ſome reliance upon, to take the breach that had been made, content if, under their cover, they reached the diviſion of the ſpoil. But unſucceſsful with their eloquence, from the hardneſs of the metal it had to work upon, nothing was left but to become themſelves the *forlorn hope*. Some ſaw and felt how much depended upon one very uncertain life, and not a little upon *another*, at beſt but precarious: and there was always ſomething to be had while the

ſeaſon

ſeaſon laſted; ſhould it never be ſo ſhort. Moreover, the chapter of accidents is the flattering reſource of thoſe who muſt venture all, or be in danger of loſing every thing. Office may be able to invigorate itſelf with the ſupport it makes, againſt much intrinſic weakneſs: and this never fails to be truſted to.

Theſe things are by no means new, it is rarely we ſee men great enough to decline the employments of the State, when the means are not left of ſerving their country. But more commonly we find people out of office, only becauſe they cannot by any means get into it: and *theſe* are always ready to run into Court on the firſt opening of the door; leaving behind them all they profeſt, when without, that they may be the more nimble for their new ſervice. This was remarkably the caſe three and twenty years ago; and has been often ſince, upon ſimiliar occaſions. It is therefore no wonder it ſhould be ſo now. It will always be the ſame, with the ſame perſons, as long as they live, and with all of a like ſort. The only maxim many are governed by, is to follow the carcaſe, as *all ravens* do. Weather-cocks and *ſtop-gaps*, even to a nick-name, are ever at hand: and the example of the old teaches the young.

Sic placet an melius quis habet ſuadere? ſecunda Ratem occupare quid moramur alite?

Thus has an eagerneſs to *have* overcome the fears of *taking*, and the ſuſpicions of not *being able to hold*: and thus we have got a Miniſtry *in ſpite of itſelf*, if I may borrow the words of the Letter: *a new Miniſtry* begot by the Favorite's reſentment againſt the *old*, upon the *hunger* of their ſucceſſors; and by many yet thought to be little better than *ſtill-born*. It is however, the *form* of a Miniſtry, or will be, if it gets time to be compleated. How the *Promethean* fire is to be brought down from heaven to animate it, I know not.

This is not the age of miracles: but ſtrange *Phenomena* we certainly ſee——great lights ſprung up *ſuddenly*, in the political hemiſphere—the firſt offices of government taken for an Eſſay of political abilities—perſons introduced by the higheſt and moſt important employments in the kingdom to the very name of Privy Counſellers; the Cabinet conſiſting of young ones created on purpoſe to compoſe it—Arthur's and Newmarket become the hopeful ſeminaries of adminiſtration—Miniſters made who have their manhood yet to prove—Stateſmen whoſe talents are ſo hidden as to be concealed even from them-

themſelves, and undiſcovered by any body elſe: pilots who were never a ſhip board.

A miracle however, greater than all theſe is ſtill wanted: for if office be not endued with the powers of inſpiration, there is viſibly nothing elſe to truſt to, for the ſafety of the nation, unleſs touching the bones of an ancient *Seer* in his grave, can conjure men who have declared themſelves incapable into fit Miniſters.

Something like the man who did not know but he could play upon the muſical inſtruments, becauſe he had never tried; the friends of this ſet of men, as they have been called, ironically 'twould ſeem, comfort us with this fine tale, that they may be very ſufficient as they have not been proved. They tell us, youth is the ſeaſon of vivacity, and ſpirit—want of experience is a defect that is always curing—what they are ſhort in abilities, they will make up in application; and it is, they ſay, very unfair and even cruel to find fault with them before they are tried.

I fear, if our country is to be fed upon ſuch jejune entertainment, ſhe muſt expire before ſhe can make a meal. The affairs of the nation, at preſent, are not a fit ſubject for experiment. 'Prentices are not for our turn, who

who have not even begun to ſerve their time. Freſh water ſailors do not ſuit the ſea we are got upon. *Jam aliquot procellis pene ſubmerſi*; we are not now in the *tranquillo mari quo quilibet nautarum rectorumque gubernare poteſt.*

Our complaint againſt the new Miniſters is not for what they have done, but that nothing has ever been done by them, to give us room to expect any thing from them; and that they have undertaken what they confeſs they are not able to do. At this rate, we may take half a dozen grenadiers out of the guards, and make Miniſters of them, and with this ſort of language amuſe the people, till the nation is undone.

The tone was the ſame when L. B. took the lead, with his *choſen* Chancellor of the Exchequer.—Give him but a trial; do not judge him before he has done good or evil. We have ſeen, and ſhall ever have reaſon to lament the effects of that *bleſſed* adminiſtration. But there is this difference too between the two caſes: thoſe who were hired to trumpet L. B.'s praiſes, cried him up as a man of incomparable (tho' they were then unknown) abilities. He had formed the ——, and none fitter to govern the ſtate. Theſe people are ſo much the more wonderful in their exceſs of folly, that they confeſs, and proclaim

their

their own inability. They bear witneſs againſt themſelves, and their witneſs muſt be true: out of their own mouths they are condemned.

Did they not refuſe the adminiſtration over and over again, becauſe they owned they were not equal to the charge? Whence got they their new light? Their language ever ſince they came into office, is a wiſh that L. T. and Mr. P— would relieve them of the weight they cannot ſuſtain. They ceaſe not to call out for help: the daily cry in the ſtreets is *odd man*. Whatever might be in their profeſſions, as to thoſe whom they would be glad to adopt for *aſſiſtants*, for the ſake of their abilities and their power with the country, which they know they are themſelves totally deſtitute of; there can be no doubt, they feel their own weakneſs more and more. It is the only experience in which they encreaſe: for they cannot, and to do them juſtice, they do not attempt real buſineſs that could be the means of acquiring knowledge. All their conduct is a continual indication of the ſenſe they have of their own feebleneſs.

Their whole work ſince they have been Miniſters has been to collect troops; to beat up in all corners for recruits: and any able-

bodied man who will repair to the drum-head, enters into preſent pay and good quarters. The muſter-roll of the forces has been much ſtudied: and thoſe who 'tis thought can fight, are even bribed to accept of commiſſions. But good ſoldiers chooſe to ſerve under good generals; and therefore there is a great backwardneſs to enliſt. Hence ſo many good poſts vacant, that have gone about a begging far and near, and had the ſingular mortification of repeated and multiplied refuſals: and ſome who were taken in early, begin to repent of their raſhneſs; they ſee things ſo deſperate.

Becauſe oppoſition to L. B. was the principle upon which this raw Miniſtry pretended to ſet out, an advantage was taken at firſt, of the ſaving of appearances, to ſacrifice part of his lumber, to make room for ſome of their own ſtuff that is equally inert. But it was very ſoon found out to be the ſafeſt way to ſtop ſhort in this reform: and even the moſt obnoxious have been ſpared, of whom there was any reaſon to be afraid. They are *ſuffered*, as the word is, to continue, that vacancies which cannot be filled for want of hands, may not become more ridiculouſly numerous: and time is allowed

lowed to the tolerated incumbents to think, that they may give a deliberate anſwer to a categorical queſtion, when the critical hour of engagement draws nigh, which prudence has directed to be put off to the greateſt diſtance poſſible, that no chance of gaining ſtrength may be loſt.

This adminiſtration, if it can be ſo called, made up, incompleat as it is, of ſhreds of every colour, is quite of a new cut. They do not pretend to have any force in themſelves: They preſume upon a *majority* as various as their own motley crew: and the ſyſtem of C——n is, they think, ſo well underſtood, and the power of it ſo commanding, that all may be hazarded, if needs muſt, upon that part of the *craft* and *myſtery* of a Miniſter, which is eaſieſt learned. So we are like never to want *undertakers*, as they were called of old; a trade lately revived, with aſtoniſhing ſucceſs truly; but with miſchief inconceivable, exceeding the moſt malicious fancy to have prognoſticated but a very little while ago, and too big now to be remedied by the beſt medicine, and the wiſeſt phyſicians within reach: though thank God, (and it is the only comfort almoſt that remains) we are not yet deprived of thoſe, whoſe ſalutary hand the

nation has experienced in elevating her, when ſunk into the moſt depreſſed and deſponding ſtate, to a pitch of unexampled and unrivalled greatneſs and ſplendor.

Who can look back, and it is not far, without infinite concern, to the days when this *wild beaſt* was for once chained after a long and fatal ravage? When the price of no man was known, and there was not a ſhop for the moſt venal to reſort to; when purity, (or at leaſt hypocriſy) attended unanimity, concord and glory: when all was quiet within, chearful and content without doors; ſerenity at home, renown abroad; ſecurity, ſafety, honour and ſucceſs walking hand in hand. 'Tis miſerable, that the curſed *plague* ſhould ever again have returned to infeſt our borders, and the time come back when *Quiſque quod venale habet oſtendit*. We know to whom we owe bitter change.

However, our new rulers, who ſtand ſo much in need of a tutor to themſelves, in midſt of all this *factitious* power, which they would fain promiſe ſo much upon, if it is even greater than I can conceive it to be, ſhould reflect upon their origin. Their predeceſſors did not die of a conſumption. They were carried off in the height of apparent health and vigour,

vigour, by a latent, but malignant diſtemper, which undermined what they thought a very ſtrong conſtitution: and that is more than the new comers can pretend to have.

One thing too is very ſurpriſing, that for all we hear, very induſtriouſly propagated, of numbers; no body is able to inform us, who is to take upon him the conduct of the —— of ——, as good Mr. F—x called it, when he ventured upon that part, ſome years ago. The Miniſters, 'tis very confidently ſaid, have not yet been able to ſettle the important point of the leaderſhip among themſelves: each ſhifts it off upon the other, humbly ſatisfied with taking the charge of what concerns his own department; which God knows is full enough for the ſtouteſt of them.

They have attempted, and even ſpoke of threatening one, who has hitherto not ſeen it meet for him to join this company of young actors, in a principle part of the drama, of the farce ſhortly to be exhibited, if courage does not wholly diſappoint the performance before the time comes: but he ſeems to be a little impracticable, nor much afraid of their fleſhing their maiden ſword in his bowels: and we do not learn that he has yet yielded.

Nor

Nor is there great probability, from what he talks pretty freely, of his opinion of these men, at the moſt *in years only*, that he will ever judge it neceſſary or expedient, to lend the hand of a maſter to help thoſe who, he thinks, can do nothing for themſelves, and muſt therefore be very harmleſs animals to others who do not chooſe to be of their group.

After all, to be ſerious, what proſpect is this to a poor, broken, burthened, and diſtracted country? Panting for breath, throbbing at the heart; groaning under diſtreſſes ſhe ſorely bled to prevent, and glorioufly, but ineffectually, conquered to expell. What is due to the *Author* of ſuch complicated ills? What light do they deſerve to ſtand in with their country, who can add to the misfortune, affecting to palliate, but in reality prolonging the diſeaſe they pretend not to cure, and letting wounds, for which they acknowledge they have no ſalve, gangrene under their unſkilful hands, with the moſt injudicious applications.

What is left for ſuch confeſſed inability to do, but to lie down and die in the bed of diſgrace and reproach their own hands have made? Can there be an excuſe for the wildneſs of ſuch temerity? To ſpeak only of the madneſs and folly of the attempt, paſſing

over

over the evident fault (to give it no harſher name) both in the motives and manner of going about it, which I am afraid bear not the ſmalleſt ſhare of the blame, and ought to receive the largeſt part of the cenſure.

I uſe the gentleſt words I can find, becauſe I do not like virulence of expreſſion: but I cannot help thinking the object was not that great one, which true and uncorrupted patriotiſm purſues with a conſtant, and conſiſtant uniformity: and there appears to have been a culpable deſertion of a common cauſe, highly intereſting to the real welfare of this country, as well as to the due luſtre and juſt independency of all men of rank and figure among us.

What has lately happened, and was long foreſeen, and foretold by ſome, can only be conſidered as the end for a great while purſued by others. It is nothing but the crown and perfection of a breach of connections, profeſſed to have been found on true publick ground; a breach to which I will not aſſign the quality it well merits to have given it; but ſhall content myſelf with ſaying, it is unworthy in any men, and neither was, nor could be made, in the way it has been, with kindneſs or friendſhip to the publick, or

with

with gratitude and good faith to particulars. They were ſtrong enough to have ſtood alone, and were preſſed into an union with thoſe who have forſaken them, and the publick with them, preſuming, upon a weight and credit quite foreign to their own pretenſions, and derived, ſo far as they had any appearance of them, from a junction which they earneſtly courted, becauſe they ſaw it neceſſary to hide their own natural inſignificance.

It was for ſome ſhort time very confidently ſaid, in vindication of the proceedings of theſe gentlemen, that they had the ſanction of one great and diſtinguiſhed patriot, whoſe approbation commands reſpect: and they did make the moſt of one or two things, in which, for their own ſakes, they ſeemed to adopt his intentions. They thought fit alſo to inſert, without leave, certain names of affinity in conſpicuous commiſſions, that the Gazette might circulate an appearance of connection. But this foundation failed, as falſe ones always will. They got an early warning of authority, which gave a check to the unwarranted uſe of that name of renown, under which they were deſirous to take ſhelter. Their bold averments

have

have ſince been converted into indirect inſinuations of an opinion, or a ſort of ſuppoſition, that the celebrated Miniſter, now enjoying the honor of his important ſervices in a private ſtation, whither eſteem and gratitude purſue him, could not diſapprove of their coming in (meaning in the manner they did) becauſe he had approved of a change in the ſervants of the Public: as if there were no difference between theſe two things, nor any diverſity of circumſtances to induce very oppoſite concluſions, ſometimes upon the ſame fact. There, however, we believe that matter reſts at preſent: and the diſcovery of the truth has been diſagreeable enough to thoſe whom it deprived of a very artificial prop they had contrived for their ſupport.

Only one other apology has ever been offered for this Miniſtry of compulſion; and their warmeſt friends are not able to urge it, without betraying a conſcious diffidence. The country, 'tis ſaid, could not be without an adminiſtration, and a change was reſolved upon—they followed example (whether willingly, or by conſtraint, let their own hearts tell them) and from a ſenſe of their weakneſs, declined the offers that others before them had refuſed—they ſollicited, preſſed, and indeed took upon them to exhort

and adviſe thoſe, whoſe ſuperior abilities they would be thought the foremoſt to recognize to accept of offices—but when theſe perſiſted in declining, they were under a neceſſity of taking government upon themſelves: elſe no body at all would have been at the helm.

An tales gubernatores ubi turbato mari rapitur vento naves? Wonderful heroiſm? Are we not much indebted to theſe brave men, who would run the riſk of their own deſtruction, to ſave their poor country? But are they the only Patriots of their day? Were none elſe to be found who felt for their bleeding country; and were ready to come to her relief?

They will not ſay ſo. But ſome are willing, others are forward: ſome have one end in view, ſome another, more or leſs noble; according to the nature of their deſires. The impartial world will apply characters and decypher deſigns. They whoſe haſte on a late occaſion has been of no utility to the ſtate, and is not likely to bring much reputation to themſelves, know thoſe who were not behind any in inclinations to ſerve their country, if they had ſeen the means of doing it with any poſſibility of ſucceſs. They know what obſtructions were in their way; and how *they* might have contributed to remove them, and to have ſettled government,

ment, in a manner advantageous to the public weal, upon foundations not eaſily to be diſturbed, and with a ſhare of it to themſelves, equal to any pretenſions they could form, of whatever kind.

But it was not their intention that the country ſhould be put into theſe honeſt hands, with that freedom and ſecurity to adminiſtration that are eſſential to any good effects. *That was clean contrary* to their purpoſe. Thoſe who ought to preſide, if ability, ſervice and ſucceſs can give a tittle to preeminence, were meant to be in the worſt ſort of ſubordination, and their names only hung out for a ſign, the more effectually to protract the old, or eſtabliſh a new ſyſtem of the moſt dangerous kind of ſubjection and deſpondence. The difference is very little in point of conſequences to the Public, whether it be under one or another, a greater or a leſs perſon, having the ſame or ſimilar power and influence of. Either is equally ſubſervient to the gaining of favorite objects to thoſe, whoſe care themſelves engroſſes their whole concern.

There is a zeal for the public ſervice; and there is alſo a thirſt after the advantages of it, which with many is ſtronger than the ardor of meriting them as rewards for great atchievements.

chievements. Honours, dignities, and badges of diſtinction pleaſe ſome; profit and emolument ſuit others who need them more, or like them better. While theſe can be attained by their different votaries, the country will be left by them to ſhift for herſelf. Any ſcheme of adminiſtration may get footing, for them, that does not interfere with their various purſuits: and they will always be glad of the pretence of ſerving her, when by profeſſing to do it, they can beſt promote their intereſted wiſhes.

Thoſe who have a real deſire to do their country good, by engaging in her ſervice, and who aſpire only to riſe upon her true greatneſs, with the ſatisfaction of being the happy inſtruments of advancing it, — thoſe will never let their country fall when it is in their power to hold her up. They will never throw away an opportunity, when it preſents, of gratifying ſo fair an ambition: and the noble object will in their minds eclipſe every inferior conſideration. But to ſuch men it is not indifferent when or how they come into office, whatever it may be how long they are out of it. The ſame motives that engage them to embrace public employment when they can do it in a right way, and to

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a good end, muſt oblige them to decline it when inconſiſtent with their principles, and incompatible with the ſincerity of their views.

It is, however, the vaineſt thing imaginable, to pretend that this country now does, and we hope ſhe never will, want the aſſiſtance of thoſe who are fit to be Miniſters, as ready as able to ſerve her when the ſervice is practicable, and the terms admiſſible with men of ſtrict honor, and poſſeſt of a true, but generous ſpirit. The apprehenſions held out of, I do not know what, a kind of vacancy in government are the mereſt pretence ever deviſed; the fruit of a brain ranſacted in ſearch of inventions to cover what is not fit to appear.

We have ſeen in our own day, the likeſt thing to an interregnum in adminiſtration, an abſolute blank in the Miniſtry, the King keeper of his own Seals for three months: but as it was a ſingular incident, and marked a very extraordinary ſituation of affairs, ſo it produced indeed marvellous effects — an adminiſtration of unparallelled harmony, and the moſt firm and glorious that ever exiſted; the fame of which will reſound to the lateſt ages, as long as there remains a faithful page of hiſtory to record its illuſtrious acts. There

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was at leaſt as little hazard of late, as at the period alluded to, if an unaccountable fatality had again driven us to ſo uncommon a chaſm. The wound would ſoon have cloſed, without leaving a ſcar where the ſhaft paſſed: and the conſequences might been deſirable and happy, as in the former inſtance.

An ignorant or unſkilful ſteerſman cannot be leſs perilous, and will probably be more deſtructive than the want of one altogether. Of the firſt the event ſhall tell: the laſt needed not at all to have been the caſe, and would not have been it long; though theſe generous-hearted gentlemen had not flown ſo haſtily to the rudder. Little was required of them: it was only to let alone; the fitteſt thing, at any rate, for them to have done. Had they been wiſe enough to have taken that part, it needs no divination to ſay, and it may without any doubt be affirmed, what would have happened. The malady would ſoon have worked its own cure: all obſtacles would have been effectually removed; and an adminiſtration ſettled upon a ſound bottom, pleaſing to the K—, which it is no ſecret this is very far from being, ſatisfactory to the people, and for the real benefit of the nation. But it would have been an adminiſtration, the parts of which would have been

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allotted to their proportionable degrees of deſert; and under which titles and things of that ſort might not have been ſo eaſily come at, there being no demand for the help and ſupport, that are purchaſed with them, to ſupply and make up the want of intrinſic ſtrength, and able conduct.

It was not that theſe noble lovers of their country, whoſe ſympathy for her at laſt carried them out of themſelves, did not ſee theſe conſequences of their holding off. They ſaw them, and of them they were afraid. They dreaded being reduced to a *role* that ſquared with their merit. They wanted an adminiſtration of *their own*; but being too incapable to form it by themſelves, they were deſirous that others poſſeſt of the neceſſary abilities ſhould be brought in to act under a predominant influence, through which they ſhould be able to operate for their own purpoſes, though they could do nothing uſeful to the ſtate.

A refuſal vexed them that marred the project of *their adminiſtration*, as they fooliſhly called it: and they could not conceal their anger at the ſnare being avoided, by which they were very near diſappointed in all their hopes (ſo far what is ſaid in the Letter is true) and were infallibly forced at length to

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the bold reſolution of taking the burden of nation upon their own ſhoulders, tho' much too heavy for them to bear. So they ſerve their country: a ſervice that is mere mockery and deluſion; for which no thanks can be expected, and never any applauſe to be got by it; but that has already, and may peradventure for ſome little time longer anſwer other ends that were more thought of, when they began the work.

It muſt indeed be the occaſion of regret, that the declining of allowed ſufficiency ſhould have made way for the admiſſion of acknowledged inability, but though it be matter of concern, it can be none of complaint againſt thoſe who did decline. The Writer of the Letter, in my hand, however, inveighs, as we have ſeen, againſt one N—n, who ſtands very high in the favor of his country, for *obſtinately refuſing*, as he terms it, not only *to join with his* illuſtrious ally, who he ſays, *perhaps would not have declined to appear at the head of others, but even to give the leaſt reaſon* for his refuſal. Yet ſurely nothing but ignorance or inattention to what has paſt, in the view of all the world, can induce any diſintereſted perſon to join

join with him in this effuſion of his rancor. Had he been aware of the force of what he himſelf has ſaid, there is enough to be extracted from it, when a little winnowed, to make all wonder ceaſe upon this head.

If this Writer is well informed as to L— T—'s not thinking it fit to give his reaſons to the friend of his boſom, the companion of his labours, in the public ſervice, and the partner in the ſacrifice he formerly made to the love he bore his country, it is not to be ſuppoſed he condeſcends to explain himſelf to others, who have no *right* to expect it: And there may, for ought we know, be reaſons for his conduct, which decency and delicacies of the tendereſt ſort reſtrain from communicating, even when no degree of confidence is wanting. But nothing is more probable than that the plainneſs of the caſe, in this inſtance, ſuperſedes the trouble of needleſs diſcuſſions upon it, being ſuch an one as ſpeaks for itſelf, with more force than a multitude of words could convey.

In my own opinion, it were but a fool's errand, to go to L— T— to aſk the reaſons of his refuſal. It is impoſſible for him not to have, and he is well entitled to ſolace himſelf with a proper conſciouſneſs of the ſignal

regards of his country, which he poſſeſſes, while others envy them, as the fruit of his honeſt and reſolute attachment to her intereſts. Every good man will eſteem theſe the nobleſt diſtinction he can bear. The public favor enjoyed by L— T— in an eminent degree, in his own perſon, as the voice of the whole nation proves and publiſhes, is an inheritance too valuable to be ſported with, or played away at the game of *Miniſter-making*, and he is but juſt to himſelf, as well as to his country, to maintain in its full extent, that unborrowed dignity, and conſideration with which it clothes him. He alſo has unqueſtionably the right that is common to all men to judge for himſelf: he is able to do it, and no ties or connections whatever can make a man renounce himſelf, his own independency, and right of diſpoſition of what alone he has the power over. People that are neceſſitous, and dependant, muſt do as they can, and will always do as they are bid, and greedily reach forth to graſp at their intereſt. But where there is true independence, which muſt be in *Spirit*, theſe ſecure an upright, and a great conduct, ſuch as reaſon and regard to every thing that is noble, dictates.

At the ſame time, I cannot but think that

if the reaſons of L— T—'s conduct on this occaſion were not of greater concern, in regard to their connection with the public ſituation, than as they affect himſelf, or tend to do juſtice to his conduct, an enquiry into them would not be ſo intereſting. It might be left to add to the wranglings that daily fill the News Papers, for the recreation of thoſe who borrow their diverſion from the genius for diſputes of all kinds, ſo incident to our countrymen: an amuſement which I have no objection to partake of, when the affection or averſion of different parties furniſhes us with it, though I cannot ſay it is much worth the while either to give or receive it.

But, in my mind, there is not a better glaſs for ſeeing the real ſtate of our country at this time than the cauſes that are apparent for L. T—'s refuſing to come into her ſervice: and in that view the ſubject may be contemplated to a better end, than the gratification of partialities of any kind.

What is it we have ſeen? One of high rank, and of approved merit; one who has filled great ſituations with honour to himſelf, and advantage to the nation; and who has taſted liberally of the nobleſt rewards of public ſpirit and public virtue, — the affections

and applauſes of his grateful country, theſe beſt incentives to heroic Patriotiſm — ſuch an one have we ſeen firſt rejecting, as it became him, a propoſition to ſerve under the undiſputable Lieutenant of an odious Favorite, againſt whoſe noxious influence, and baneful counſels, he had made the boldeſt ſtand——and then declining an offer, which the firſt refuſal had forced, of an office that would nominally have put him at the head of the public ſervice, but in reality in ſuch a way, as muſt have diſabled him to purſue it with any ſucceſs, and only expoſed him to ſhare the deeper in the diſgraces and misfortunes of his country, the cauſe of which he had oppoſed and ſtruggled to remove.

It is nothing new to obſerve the graſpings of vain and fooliſh ambition; but he is a Phœnix, almoſt without example, and pretty ſure not to be much imitated, who is proof againſt the attractives of power, and can reſiſt the ſweets of emolument. And is this, does any body think, done without good reaſon? Every effect muſt have an adequate cauſe. It is therefore but fair to conclude, that there muſt have been ſomething very ſtrong to overbalance ſo much of what are the objects of men's keeneſt purſuits in common:

mon: and when one decides againſt himſelf, and what is thought to be his intereſt, it is not juſt to ſuſpect, and will probably be hard to prove, that his motives are partial or culpable.

We may without being in L— T—'s counſels, or pretending to unravel myſteries, ſafely ſay, he did not want inducements to accept of the great poſt, that preſented itſelf as a ſupplicant at his gate; a poſt that has often been ſought, but ſeldom, perhaps never refuſed, and to him added gracious importunity to the *powerful* arguments of intereſt. One capable of ſuch refuſal, cannot be ſuppoſed to be wholly deſtitute of that laudable ambition natural to great minds, which prompts as well as enables them to ſhine in elevated ſtations. Laying aſide the ties of allegiance, in a trial it is ſeldom put to; it were very ſtrange, if any ſubject could be deaf to the voice, or indifferent to the wiſhes of the people of England, in a diſtinction ſo peculiarly honorable to himſelf. Not only the noble paſſions, but reſentments of a lower kind, natural to humanity, if theſe were worthy of a place in ſuch a conſideration, might have moved him not to decline a triumph over injuries, though he was too great to have felt them. In ſhort, duty to his

his King, his country, as well as to himſelf, and his friends, had all their ſeveral claims for his acceptance.

To weigh down all this, the Writer of the Letter has found only one motive, which he puts in the oppoſite ſcale; but one that, upon cool reflection, muſt appear to have been the leaſt capable of having any influence at all: and that is L— T—'s deſire (as he calls it) *to ſave his b——r Mr. G—— in conſequence of their reconciliation.*

The chance of that was worth no price at all: and the difference of the elder brother, *without* iſſue filling the office of the younger *with*, could be an object, it ſhould ſeem, of ſmall conſideration between themſelves. Without much penetration, one might have found out, that a Miniſtry that had twice got warning within the month, and that had been called back confeſſedly from a preſent neceſſity, could not probably ſtand long. Any Politician, but ſuch an one as the Favorite, who adviſed to remove a *whole adminiſtration*, before he had provided a ſucceſſor for any *one office*, would, in order to cover his own deſigns as far as he could without fruſtrating them, have left the Miniſtry he had reſolved to get rid of to the natural conſequences of that debility, which

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the convulſion they had ſuffered muſt have produced.

From ſuch undeniable evidence of a total withdrawing of confidence, their external ſupport muſt of courſe have failed; and their own union very likely have given way, while the moſt dependent of them were looking each for a plank to ſave himſelf. Mr. G—, who was leaſt in that ſituation, muſt rather, if one could gueſs, have been tired of his ſituation: and if the reconciliation, to which the Writer of the Letter alludes, had any political effect whatever, upon him in ſuch circumſtances, it might have been a deſire to reſign, eſpecially to ſo agreeable a ſucceſſor. He thereby would only have fallen into the boſom of his own family, which whatever this Writer thinks, few people will believe was, as he ſays, the moſt likely way to *deprive him of the means of recovering from the fall*; if that was any object at all in view.

However, it might reaſonably enough be aſked this Writer, if he thinks the reconciliation between L— T— and his brother had alſo reconciled L— T— to all the old Miniſtry? None could well be alarmed with ſuch a ſuſpicion, but thoſe who were conſcious, that their own conduct had left them

little

little better pretenſions upon L— T—'s favor, than the members of the late adminiſtration whom he leaſt affected could have: which was indeed a very material conſideration to a number of expectants who looked to the ſcramble, incident to a change, in caſe L— T— had the diſpoſal of places.

We may therefore, without aſſuming too much, overlook the fooliſh motive to which this author aſcribes L— T——'s refuſal, as worthy of no credit, whoever *aſſured* him of it; or however *probable* he would perſuade us it is: and we muſt of neceſſity lay out of the caſe all partial conſiderations perſonal to L— T—— himſelf, becauſe evidently, theſe are all on the ſide of his accepting; ſo much— ſo, that their not having had their natural and common effect, only proves the ſtrength of the real obſtacles, as well as that they were of a different kind.

It is not really ſo hard, I think, to find out the true reaſon of L— T——'s refuſal, as 'tis to aſſign any other that can bear the teſt of reaſon. What could it be, but an apprehenſion of the impoſſibility to do his King and country that ſervice, which an honeſt man would wiſh to do in the ſtation he declined,

clined, and that the Public has a right to expect from every man who goes into it.

The N— L—d, we may ſuppoſe, knew more of the real ſituation of things than the Public at large can. But to what has been obſerved in the progreſs of theſe animadverſions, little needs be added to evince that his apprehenſions were not groundleſs. Stronger evidence cannot be required of the continued aſcendant of L— B—, and that his aim was ſtill to maintain an abſolute dominion over this country, by being maſter of any Miniſtry, to decide their fate, not according to their conduct towards the nation, but according to their ſubmiſſion to him.

This muſt reſolve all government into the mere arbitrary will and pleaſure of the Favorite, and make the beſt adminiſtration that could be formed unſtable as water, ſo that it cannot excel. Who does not feel, that this inſtability has already made us the ſcorn of all Europe, and the ſport of our enemies, to whom it gives confidence in proportion as it enfeebles ourſelves? Nor can there be an end of it, or of its unhappy conſequences, but by the annihilation of the influence of the Favorite. The title has been inauſpicious in all

examples; and thoſe who now decline the ſervice of their country, may with great propriety make their defence in the words of Charles the Firſt's Parliament, concerning the Duke of Buckingham, when they ſaid to that unhappy King, "We proteſt to your Majeſty, and to the whole world, that till this perſon be removed from intermeddling in the affairs of ſtate, we are out of hope of any good ſucceſs."

I know L. B. denies that he has intermedled, ſince he quitted office. But why does he deny it? In defence againſt the charge of the late Miniſters, of breach of ſolemn engagements he came under to them, even to remove from the K—'s preſence, which engagements, it ſeems he cannot diſpute. The denial has gained more credit to the aſſertion than ever itſelf did: but it has not made the fact deemed in the leaſt doubtful. No body, who knows any thing of late tranſactions, is ignorant, that even in public and national concerns the late Miniſter was openly thwarted by L. B—'s friends, whenever his partial affections gave them their tone: and no influence whatever is to be ſeen but L. B—'s in the whole buſineſs of the late change.

Who

Who elſe could have ſuggeſted the propoſition of L— N——d for the head of the treaſury, to make an open reſurrection of L. B—'s name, in a perſon dear to him? L. T— might juſt as well have been *inſerted* in L. B—'s adminiſtration revived: and that firſt modeſt propoſition is a *maſter-key* to all that has followed.

Did not L. B. call in the aid of the —— of —— who condeſcended to undertake the negociation? This explained a remarkable viſit which L. B. and his brother had ſhortly before deigned for the firſt time to make at the levee of a certain r--yl perſonage, whom they had before execrated; and the neglect of whom at court for four years paſt, is but a ſmall circumſtance, compared to the inſults and abuſe poured upon him in public, by L. B---'s hirelings.

It has been greatly ſuſpected that there was an agreement ſtipulating protection to L. B. But there is evidence ſufficient, that L. B. called for the new Miniſtry; and did he call for a new Miniſtry to *kill himſelf*, only becauſe he did not like to die by the hands of the old? If he is killed by any Miniſtry called by him, he is diſappointed, probably deceived; for he did not mean it. He intended

once more to ſhew his power in the formation of another adminiſtration. The invitation coming virtually from him implied terms of ſubmiſſion, and by *making*, he manifeſted he could *unmake* Miniſters, and that he would diſmiſs the new, as he did the old, when he pleaſed, that is, when they did not pleaſe him. I only aſk, if the Miniſters *of the country* could ſuffer themſelves to become Miniſters in ſuch a manner? Or would they not thereby have acknowledged themſelves to be the ſervants of the Favorite?

Not men only, but meaſures are at the option of the Favorite, and upon theſe the duration of Miniſters depends while he rules. This will not indeed create any difficulty in the way of thoſe, who conſider the moſt momentous employments of the ſtate only, as proviſion for themſelves, and a means of providing for their friends. To ſuch men any ſyſtem, *Pruſſian* or *Auſtrian*, or no ſyſtem is alike, if they can but keep in their places; and 'tis a very comfortable reflection to them, that there is one who can open the ſluice of honor to whom, and ſhut it againſt whom he pleaſes, becauſe ſubmiſſion to him will always be one great ſecurity from the danger of being removed.

Thoſe

Thoſe who can find in their heart to refuſe great offices, have another ſenſe of things. Men who know what the truſt of government is, and what the public ſervice requires, muſt have the means, and ſome reaſonable proſpect of performing it, before they undertake the charge. But ſo different is L. B's ſcheme from that of thoſe, of whoſe ſervice their country is now deprived, that they cannot be employed, while his influence is predominant, without adopting his ſyſtem, and abandoning their own views of the National Intereſt. For they have already had the experience what iſſue is to be expected in a conteſt with the Favorite's counſels; and need not reſume employments only, to encounter the ſame difficulties in the public ſervice, which obliged them to quit it before.

We know the C—b—t has been poiſoned with L— B—'s ſyſtem; and that this has been one of the great obſtacles in the way of getting back to the public ſervice thoſe Miniſters to whom the eyes of all England look. Indeed the ſyſtem was taken up, as the beſt method of expelling them, in order to compaſs L— B—'s great object, of engroſſing the whole power of this country into his own hands;

hands: and difficult as it might have appeared to be, to fall upon a ſyſtem that could have inverted the ſtate of this country, in the midſt of the unanimity and ſucceſs, in which L— B— found us, when he firſt came upon the political ſtage, he was wonderfully ſucceſsful in his attempt to get poſſeſſion of the reins of government.

For that L— T—— and Mr. P— were forced from the K—'s counſels, by an advice of which the declaration of war againſt Spain was a moſt ample vindication, though it was a labored apology for oppoſing it. *For that* the D. of N——, after having been induced to concur in chaſing away Mr. P—, was himſelf diſmiſſed with ignominy, to leave in ſole poſſeſſion the Favorite, whom his G— had thought fit, *by an act of his own*, to bring into a miniſterial office, to counterbalance the weight of Mr. P—. *For that* we got a *glorious* peace, and *bought* from *ourſelves* an approbation of it, *becauſe* we were not able to carry on a war, the ſucceſſes of which, had almoſt made an end of its expence. *For that* we diſſolved our natural alliances abroad, and renounced all connections with the common cauſe of Liberty, and the independency of Europe, *becauſe* we are powerful enough

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to ſtand alone, againſt the moſt formidable union we ever ſaw of our enemies. *For that* a door was opened without diſtinction at home to all the enemies of the K—'s family, *becauſe* that was the only way to root out Jacobitiſm, and to introduce into places, thoſe who ſeemed to think the adminiſtration of a Stuart, to which their *new* loyalty was confined, was the next thing to a reign of that nam. And *with all theſe* L. B. might, for ought I know, have yet been the Miniſter *himſelf*, if his want of courage had not done more for us than our own virtue.

Theſe evils, for evils I think they are, or their evil conſequences, remain yet to be cured; and they can only be cured, ſo far as they are at all capable of a remedy, by adopting a contrary ſyſtem. Let others judge what proſpect there was of purſuing it with ſucceſs, in an adminiſtration, at the root of which the Favorite was, and that muſt be ſubject to the check of his influence. For my part, I can blame no man for declining to take part in an adminiſtration, which was openly ſet up to auction, and at the ſame inſtant offered to three different ſets; that they might bid upon each other, for the beſt conditions to the Favorite and his influence; or

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to ſecure the loweſt and moſt ſubmiſſive obſequiouſneſs to *another*, in ſome reſpects more formidable, and in that point not leſs exceptionable, called in, to divide with him, or for ſome time to ſucceed him in his irreſiſtible ſway; perhaps to hold it in depoſit for him: an adminiſtration, the purpoſe of appointing which, and the terms of being in it, were only to turn out all thoſe who had reſiſted the Favorite, and to protect his particular friends, whoſe attachments were where their intereſt in his favor naturally led them to be. And ſuch muſt have been the caſe, from the very cauſes of the change, and the complexion of the negociation towards it.

Were we to run through all the endleſs train of difficulties, which a very ſlight ſurvey of the ſubject might preſent to us, it would be more difficult to end than begin; and we might be led into a theme on which it would be but unpleaſant to inſiſt. Great however as the obſtacles from the Favorite are, we may certainly pronounce they are not all. A *manacled* adminiſtration cannot be very ſucceſsful; and every one would not chooſe to be a Miniſter, when the whole regal power is conſigned into the hands of a ſub-

a ſubject of a degree above an ordinary ſervant, whoſe ſyſtem is not the ſame with theirs, who are to anſwer for government. Nor would many chooſe to accept of an office of principal reſponſibility, under the control of one, whom it may not be the leſs neceſſary, that it is the more incommodious to oppoſe. Wiſe men, and to ſuch I ſpeak, will judge what I ſay on this head; and to their reflection it is moſt fit to leave it. We may only remark, that the fluctuations in politicks are very ſtrange. So we now ſee, thoſe who were undone by L. B. as the reward for giving him birth, when he was but the embryo of a Miniſter, come forth at his call, diminiſhed as they are, by various accidents, in weight and numbers; a wretched remnant, whom no experience can make wiſe, when lured by the tempting bait of emolument, or dazled by the very ſhadow of power, if I may uſe the expreſſion. We ſee them alſo acting under one greater in rank than L. B. from whoſe power they formerly apprehended ſo much danger to their own, that they thought it neceſſary to deſtroy the high object of their jealouſy, and actually did it.

What the end of conjunctions, in ſpite of ſuch diſcordant qualities, may be, I take not upon me to propheſy. But we may, with-

out the ſpirit of divination, ſee it is of ſome importance in the determination of a judicious perſon, whether to be a Miniſter or not, what inſtruments there are to act with, if the ſervice is undertaken. And what ſatisfaction could one promiſe to himſelf, if his own principle was a determined oppoſition to the Favorite, and many of his aſſiſtants were to be thoſe who had been eager to act under the Favorite's *Lieutenant*, and had warmly preſſed him to do the ſame, as a pioneer to ſecure to them ſome inferior ſteps of promotion, when they could not reſolve upon aſcending the uppermoſt form themſelves, as they afterwards did.

To theſe, the influence of the Favorite can have been no objection: they ſeem to be more congenial to him. If they meant to ſtand upon that ground, we ſhall ſee how long they are able, by *proper means*, to keep it under their feet. If they deſigned to break the yoke, after they are a little confirmed, the event will then ſhew how far their ſtrength goes, and whether they did well to ſlight the cautions of thoſe, who had themſelves been *broken* becauſe they would not *bow*; or if they took the moſt probable way to gain the deſired victory.

As

As to the ſucceſs of public affairs, under ſo many difficulties, and when the ſtate groans under the weight of its troubles; young adventurers, *Militia* who have ſeen no ſervice, may hazard an experiment. If they ſucceed, they will have great merit, diſappoint many, pay themſelves, and prove they did not know their own abilities, when they were ſo afraid to venture the leap. If they fail, they will loſe no character, and only have to deſcend again, till their abilities encreaſe, improved with the experience they have got, in an unſucceſsful attempt.

In the mean time, the boldneſs ſome have ſhewn in accepting offices, is not yet ſufficiently juſtified, to warrant us to find fault with others for declining them. Though theſe will not proſtitute themſelves to the profit of employments, when they knock at their door, we have no reaſon to think they will be backward to encounter the greateſt difficulties attending the ſituation of their country, when ſuch are the only obſtruction to their engaging in her ſervice. They have given us no cauſe, from any part of their public conduct, in time paſt, to believe they are eaſily to be ſcared from their

duty, when fairly called to it. We have ſeen the terror of that conſciouſneſs, which will make a thouſand fly before one, drive a Favorite from the height of his vain ambition, almoſt when none purſued. But men who have nothing in themſelves to fear, whoſe ſhield is their own virtue, do not run from their arms, in the field, where they have before fought with honor. Something is to be truſted to the courage, and ſomething is alſo due to the wiſdom and diſcretion, as well as to the integrity and good intentions of thoſe, who have had the magnanimity to quit great ſtations, when no longer to be held to any purpoſe, but to ſanctify meaſures they could not approve, or to load themſelves with the errors of miſconduct they could not prevent: and in a private ſituation have ſet their face againſt the fierceſt reſentment of incenſed power, and the moſt violent proſcriptions of an inflamed court, ſtirred up to fury by art and invention.

Such men will ſerve their country when they can do it, with the ſame fortitude with which they ſuffered with her. It is even to be expected from them, if ever they are Miniſters again, that they will be heroic enough to combat the pretenſions of popularity, if they

they ſhould at any time interfere with rectitude of principle: and that is as hard a ſtruggle as any. But withal, it would be doing them injuſtice to look for that ſort of ſtoutneſs in them, which poſſeſſes none but the ignorant and unwary. Blind men only walk, without concern, to the edge of a precipice. Leaving therefore the ill-judged, if not ill-deſigned cenſure of the Letter before me to futurity for further reproof; I ſhall, to conclude, join with the Writer of it in the wiſh he profeſſes (which is the only thing in which I can agree with him) *that all may turn out for the beſt.*

I am, &c.

FINIS.

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